The Wall Street Journal October 26, 1995

What the ’93 Tax Increases Really Did

By Martin Feldstein

President Clinton was right when he recently told business groups in Virginia and Texas that he had raised taxes too much in 1993, perhaps more so than he realizes. We now have the first hard evidence on the effect of the Clinton tax rate increases. The new data, published by the Internal Revenue Service, show that the sharp jump in tax rates raised only one-third as much revenue as the Clinton administration had predicted.

Because taxpayers responded to the sharply higher marginal tax rates by reducing their taxable incomes, the Treasury lost two-thirds of the extra revenue that would have been collected if taxpayers had not changed their behavior. Moreover, while the Treasury gained less than $6 billion in additional personal income tax revenue, the distortions to taxpayers' behavior depressed their real incomes by nearly $25 billion.

To understand how taxpayer behavior could produce such a large revenue shortfall, recall that the Clinton plan raised the marginal personal income tax rate to 36% from 31% on incomes between $140,000 ($115,000 for single taxpayers) and $250,000, and to 39.6% on all incomes over $250,000. Relatively small reductions in taxable income in response to these sharply higher rates can eliminate most or all of the additional tax revenue that would result with no behavioral response.

If a couple with $200,000 of taxable income reduces its income by just 5% in response to the higher tax rate, the Treasury loses more from the $10,000 decline in income ($3,100 less revenue at 31%) than it gains from the higher tax rate on the remaining $50,000 of income above the$140,000 floor ($2,500 more revenue at 5%); the net effect is that the Treasury collects $600 less than it would have if there had been no tax rate increase.

Similarly, a couple with $400,000 of taxable income would pay $18,400 in extra taxes if its taxable income remained unchanged. But if that couple responds to the nearly 30% marginal tax rate increase by cutting its taxable income by as little as 8%, the Treasury's revenue gain would fall 67% to less than $6,000.

How can taxpayers reduce their taxable incomes in this way?

Self-employed taxpayers, two-earner couples, and senior executives can reduce their taxable earnings by a combination of working fewer hours, taking more vacations, and shifting compensation from taxable cash to untaxed fringe benefits. Investors can shift from taxable bonds and high yield stocks to tax exempt bonds and to stocks with lower dividends. Individuals can increase tax deductible mortgage borrowing and raise charitable contributions. (I ignore reduced realizations of capital gains because the 1993 tax rate changes did not raise the top capital gains rate above its previous 28% level.)

To evaluate the magnitude of the taxpayers' actual responses, Daniel Feenberg at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and I studied the published IRS estimates of the 1992 and 1993 taxable incomes of high income taxpayers (i.e., taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes over $200,000, corresponding to about $140,000 of taxable income). We compared the growth of such incomes with the corresponding rise in taxable incomes for taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes between $50,000 and $200,000. Since the latter group did not experience a 1993 tax rate change, the increase of their taxable incomes provides a basis for predicting how taxable incomes would have increased in the high income group if its members had not changed their behavior in response to the higher post-1992 tax rates. We calculated this with the help of the NBER's TAXSIM model, a computer analysis of more than 100,000 random, anonymous tax returns provided by the IRS.

We concluded that the high income

taxpayers reported 8.5% less taxable income in 1993 than they would have if their tax rates had not increased. This in turn reduced the additional tax liabilities of the high income group to less than one-third of what they would have been if they had not changed their behavior in response to the higher tax rates.

This sensitivity of taxable income to marginal tax rates is quantitatively similar to the magnitude of the response that I found when I studied taxpayers' responses to the tax rate cuts of 1986. It is noteworthy also that such a strong response to the 1993 tax increases occurred within the first year. It would not be surprising if the taxpayer responses get larger as taxpayers have more time to adjust to the higher tax rates by retiring earlier, by choosing less demanding and less remunerative occupations, by buying larger homes and second homes with new mortgage deductions, etc.

The 1993 tax law also eliminated the $135,000 ceiling on the wage and salary income subject to the 2.9% payroll tax for Medicare. When this took effect in January 1994, it raised the tax rate on earnings to 38.9% for taxpayers with incomes between $140,000 and $250,000 and to 42.5% on incomes above $250,000Although we will have to wait until data are available for 1994 to see the effect of that extra tax rate rise, the evidence for 1993 suggests that taxpayers' responses to the higher marginal tax rates would cut personal income tax revenue by so much that the net additional revenue from eliminating the ceiling on the payroll tax base would be less than $1 billion.

All of this stands in sharp contrast to the official revenue estimates produced by the staffs of the Treasury and of the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation before the 1993 tax legislation was passed. Their estimates were based on the self-imposed "convention" of ignoring the effects of tax rate changes on the amount that people work and invest. The combination of that obviously false assumption and a gross underestimate of the other ways in which taxpayer behavior reduces taxable income caused the revenue estimators at the Treasury to conclude that taxpayer behavior would reduce the additional tax revenue raised by the higher rates by only 7%. In contrast, the actual experience shows a revenue reduction that is nearly 10 times as large as the Treasury staff assumed.

This experience is directly relevant to the debate about whether Congress should use "dynamic" revenue estimates that take into account the effect of taxpayer behavior on tax revenue. The 1993 experience shows that unless such behavior is taken into account, the revenue estimates presented to Congress can grossly overstate the revenue gains from higher tax rates (and the revenue costs of lower tax rates). Although the official revenue estimating staffs claim that their estimates are dynamic because they take into account some taxpayer behavior, the 1993 experience shows that as a practical matter the official estimates are close to being "static" no-behavioral-response estimates because they explicitly ignore the effect of taxes on work effort and grossly underestimate the magnitude of other taxpayer responses.

If Congress had known in 1993 that raising top marginal tax rates from 31% to more than 42% would raise less than $7 billion a year, including the payroll tax revenue as well as the personal income tax revenue, it might not have been possible for President Clinton to get the votes to pass his tax increase.

Which brings us back to President Clinton's own statement (half-recanted the next day) that he raised taxes too much in 1993. Congress and the president will soon be negotiating about the final shape of the 1995 tax package. The current congressional tax proposals do nothing to repeal the very harmful rate increases of 1993. Rolling back both the personal tax rates and the Medicare payroll tax base to where they were before 1993 would cost less than $7 billion a year in revenue and would raise real national income by more than $25 billion. Now that the evidence is in, Congress and the president should agree to undo a bad mistake.

----

* Mr. Feldstein, former chairman of the president's Council of Economic Advisers, is a professor of economics at Harvard.